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The Atkinson-Stiglitz (1976) theorem on the undesirability of nonuni-
form excise taxation when all agents have homogeneous, separable
preferences is extended to allow for nonseparability with respect to
endogenous variables that will be subject to distortions. The result is
useful for analysing models with production and education. For such
models, the conclusion of Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005), that it is de-
sirable to distort production rather than education choices, is shown
to be reversed if the hidden characteristic a⁄ects the cost of education
rather than productivity.
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1 Introduction
A well known result by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) shows that, under cer-
tain homogeneity and separability assumptions on preferences, an optimal
system of taxes for public-sector funding or for redistribution relies on direct
taxation only. Kaplow (2006) and Laroque (2005) have recently extended
this result to show that, under the assumptions of Atkinson and Stiglitz,
￿I am grateful for discussions with Guy Laroque and for helpful comments from Felix
Bierbrauer, Christoph Engel, and Andreas Nicklisch.
1any feasible, incentive-compatible allocation is Pareto-dominated by an al-
location that can be implemented by direct taxation, without recourse to
distortionary indirect taxes. This note uses the argument of Kaplow (2006)
and Laroque (2005) to show that their result is a special case of a more
general theorem with a weaker separability assumption on preferences.1 It
also gives an example with production and education where this weakening
of separability is relevant, showing that the results of Bovenberg and Jacobs
(2005) are sensitive to the way the hidden characteristics enter the model.
2 The Setup
I consider a model in which agents care about outcomes that are speci￿ed
as n-dimensional vectors (x1;:::;xn) 2 Rn: An agent￿ s preferences over out-
comes depend on his "type", a parameter t that lies in an interval [t0;t1]:
His preferences are represented by a utility function u; which is assumed to
take the separable form
u(x1;:::;xn;t) = v(’(x1;:::;xn);xn;t); (1)
where v and ’ are continuously di⁄erentiable functions, with derivatives
satisfying v’ > 0 and ’i > 0 for all i: The function v is also assumed to sat-
isfy the single-crossing condition that
vxn
v’ ; the marginal rate of substitution
between ’ and xn; is everywhere increasing in t:
In Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), Kaplow (2006), and Laroque (2005), the
outcome variables x1;:::;xn￿1 ￿ 0 would be consumption levels of di⁄erent
goods, xn = ￿y, where y is the level of output that the agent produces, and
t a productivity parameter, with the interpretation that ‘ =
y
t is the amount
of labour the agent needs to put in to produce the output y: In their work,








which clearly is a special case of (1). Besides allowing for a more general
form of the dependence of utility on t; (1) di⁄ers from (2) by allowing for the
possibility that the subutility ’ may depend on all outcome variables, rather
than just x1;:::;xn￿1: This di⁄erence plays a role in a model of education




) ￿ e(z;t); (3)
1A similar generalization is obtained by Gauthier and Laroque (2008).
2where x1 = c is the agent￿ s consumption, x2 = ￿y is the agent￿ s output,
and x3 = z is the agent￿ s labour productivity. The labour productivity is
identi￿ed with the education level z: To reach this level, the agent must
spend the e⁄ort e(z;t); which depends on his type t as well as the education
level z: In this speci￿cation, by contrast to (2), the agent￿ s type t a⁄ects the
cost of reaching the productivity level (or education level) z, rather than the
productivity level itself.
3 Incentive Compatibility
An agent￿ s type is assumed to be his private information. An allocation
is a mapping t ! (x1(t);:::;xn(t)) that indicates how outcomes depend on
types. An allocation is incentive-compatible on the interval [t0;t1] if
u(x1(t);:::;xn(t);t) ￿ u(x1(t0);:::;xn(t0);t) (4)
for all t and t0 in [t0;t1]: Under the separability assumption (1), this condition
is equivalent to the requirement that
v(w(t);xn(t);t) ￿ v(w(t0);xn(t0);t); (5)
for all t and t0 in [t0;t1]; where, for each t;
w(t) := ’(x1(t);:::;xn(t)): (6)
Incentive compatibility depends only on xn(t) and on the subutility w(t) that
is given by (6). Which combination of the outcome variables x1;:::;xn￿1 is
combined with xn(t) to achieve the subutility w(t) is irrelevant for incentive
compatibility. Formally, one obtains:
Lemma 1 Let (x1(￿);:::;xn(￿)) be an incentive-compatible allocation. For
each t; let w(t) be given by (6), and let ^ x1(t);:::; ^ xn￿1(t) be such that
’(^ x1(t);:::; ^ xn￿1(t);xn(t)) = w(t): (7)
Then the allocation (^ x1(￿);:::; ^ xn￿1(￿);xn(￿)) is also incentive-compatible.
The observation that incentive compatibility reduces to condition (5)
brings the analysis into the domain of known results about incentive com-
patibility. Given that v satis￿es a single-crossing conditions, by well-known
arguments yield:2
2The ￿rst version of this lemma is to be found in Mirrlees (1976). A proof without
di⁄erentiability assumptions on the function V (￿) is given in Hellwig (2006/2008).
3Lemma 2 An allocation (x1(￿);:::;xn(￿)) is incentive-compatible on [t0;t1]
if and only if xn(￿) is a nondecreasing function and, for all t and t0 in [t0;t1],
one has





V (t) := v(w(t);xn(t);t): (9)
4 Feasibility and Dominance
Let F be the cross-section distribution of agents￿types, where F has support
[t0;t1]: An allocation is said to be feasible if the aggregates
R
xi(t)dF(t);





xi(t)dF(t) ￿ K; (10)
where p1;:::;pn ￿ 0 and K are given constants. If the inequality in (10) is
strict, the allocation is said to be strictly feasible.








pixi s.t. ’(x1;:::;xn￿1;xn(t)) ￿ w(t) (11)
for a nonnegligible set of types, where w(t) is given by (6). Then there exists
an allocation (^ x1(￿);:::; ^ xn￿1(￿); ^ xn(￿)) with ^ xn(￿) = xn(￿) that is strictly fea-
sible and incentive-compatible on [t0;t1] and that generates the same payo⁄s
as the allocation (x1(￿);:::;xn(￿)):
Proof. For each t; if x1(t);:::;xn￿1(t) minimizes
Pn￿1
i=1 pixi under the con-
straint that ’(x1;:::;xn￿1;xn(t)) ￿ w(t); let ^ xi(t) = xi(t); i = 1;:::;n ￿ 1; if







4and, moreover, ’(^ x1(t);:::; ^ xn￿1(t);xn(t)) = w(t). By construction, the al-
location (^ x1(￿);:::; ^ xn￿1(￿);xn(￿)) is strictly feasible and payo⁄-equivalent to
the allocation (x1(￿);:::;xn(￿)): By Lemma 1, it is also incentive-compatible
on [t0;t1].
If the surplus of the allocation (^ x1(￿);:::; ^ xn￿1(￿);xn(￿)) can be redis-
tributed to the participants without upsetting incentive compatibility, the
allocation (x1(￿);:::;xn(￿)) in Lemma 3 is actually Pareto-dominated. This
is the point of:
Lemma 4 If (x1(￿);:::;xn(￿)) satisfy the assumptions of Lemma 3. there
exists an (￿ x1(￿);:::; ￿ xn(￿)) that is feasible and incentive-compatible on [t0;t1]
and that provides every type with a payo⁄ that is strictly greater than his
payo⁄ under the allocation (x1(￿);:::;xn(￿)):
Proof Sketch. Given the allocation (x1(￿);:::;xn(￿)); let V (￿) and w(￿) be
given by (9) and (6) and, for any ￿ ￿ 0; consider the integral equation
W(t;￿) = W(t0;￿) +
Z t
t0
vt( ￿ w(￿;￿);xn(￿);￿)d￿; (12)
with the initial condition
W(t0;￿) = V (t0) + ￿; (13)
where, for any ￿,
￿ w(￿;￿) := v￿1(W(￿;￿);xn(￿);￿) (14)
is the value of the subutility ’ that is needed if type ￿ is to have the payo⁄
W(￿;￿) when the n-th outcome is given as xn(￿): It is straightforward
to show that, for any ￿ ￿ 0; the function W(￿;￿) is well de￿ned, and
that W(t;￿) is increasing in ￿; as well as jointly continuous in t and ￿; 3
moreover, one has W(t;0) = V (t) and ￿ w(t;0) = w(t) for all t:
Next, let (^ x1(￿);:::; ^ xn￿1(￿); ^ xn(￿)) be the allocation that is given by Lemma
3. For any ￿; let (￿ x￿
1 (￿);:::; ￿ x￿
n (￿)) be such that ￿ x￿
n (￿) = xn(￿); ￿ x￿
i (￿) = ^ xi(￿)
for i = 2;:::;n ￿ 1; and by ￿xing ￿ x￿
1 (￿) so that, for any t;
’(￿ x￿
1 (￿); ^ x2(￿);:::; ^ xn￿1(￿);xn(￿)) = ￿ w(￿;￿):
By construction, for any t 2 [t0;t1]; the allocation (￿ x￿
1 (￿);:::; ￿ x￿
n (￿)) gen-
erates the utility level W(t;￿). Because W(t;￿) is increasing in ￿; for
3For details of the argument, see the Appendix to Hellwig (2008 a).
5￿ > 0; one has W(t;￿) > V (t). If ￿ is su¢ ciently small, the alloca-
tion (￿ x￿
1 (￿);:::; ￿ x￿
n (￿)) is uniformly close to the strictly feasible allocation
(^ x1(￿);:::; ^ xn￿1(￿);xn(￿)) and must itself be feasible. By Lemma 2, it is also
incentive-compatible on [t0;t1].
By the taxation principle of Hammond (1979) and Guesnerie (1995), one
now obtains the following extension of the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem.
Theorem 5 If the allocation (x1(￿);:::;xn(￿)) is Pareto-optimal in the set
of feasible, incentive-compatible allocations, there exists a tax schedule T(￿);
de￿ned on the range of the function xn(￿); such that, for almost all t 2
[t0;t1]; (x1(t);:::;xn(t)) maximizes u(x1;:::;xn;t) under the constraints that
xn belong to the range of the function xn(￿) and that
n X
i=1
pixi + T(xn) ￿ 0. (15)
Proof. For any xn and w; let ^ x1(xn;w);:::; ^ xn￿1(xn;w) be a solution to the
problem of minimizing
Pn￿1
i=1 pixi under the constraint that ’(x1;:::;xn) ￿
w; and let E(xn;w) =
Pn￿1
i=1 pi^ xi(xn;w): By Lemmas 3 and 4 and the Pareto-
optimality of the allocation (x1(￿);:::;xn(￿)); one must have
n￿1 X
i=1
pixi(t) = E(xn(t);w(t)) (16)
for almost all t 2 [t0;t1]; where, again w(t) is given by (6).
For any t 2 [t0;t1]; let
￿(t) = ￿E(xn(t);w(t)) ￿ pnxn(t): (17)
I claim that, for any t and t0; xn(t) = xn(t0) implies ￿(t) = ￿(t0): For
suppose that xn(t) = xn(t0) and ￿(t) 6= ￿(t0): If ￿(t) > ￿(t0); then, by
(17), one must have w(t) < w(t0): By the monotonicity of v; it follows
that v(w(t);xn(t)) < v(w(t0);xn(t)) = v(w(t0);xn(t0)); contrary to the as-
sumption that the allocation (x1(￿);:::;xn(￿)) is incentive-compatible. The
assumption that xn(t) = xn(t0) and ￿(t) > ￿(t0) thus leads to a contra-
diction and must be false. A precisely symmetric argument eliminates the
possibility that xn(t) = xn(t0) and ￿(t) < ￿(t0):
Because xn(t) = xn(t0) implies ￿(t) = ￿(t0); there exists a function T(￿);
de￿ned on the range of xn(￿) such that, for any t 2 [t0;t1]; one has ￿(t) =







regardless of t: By incentive-compatibility, it follows that
u(x1;:::;xn;t) ￿ v(w(t);xn(t);t) = u(x1(t);:::;xn(t);t)
for any such (x1;:::;xn) and any t:
Remark 6 The tax schedule T(￿) in Theorem 5 can be extended to any
compact interval containing the range of the function xn(￿): For any xn
that does not belong to this range, one just has to choose the tax T(xn) to be
large enough so that no type would like to choose a vector (x1;:::;xn) which
gives rise to this high tax.





xn(t)dF(t)) ￿ 0 if convexity assump-
tions on preferences and technology make it possible to work with a vector
(p1;:::;pn￿1) of producer prices as in the second welfare theorem.
Remark 8 The extension of the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem that is provided
by Theorem 5 is not available for Deaton￿ s (1979) theorem on the undesir-
ability of nonuniform excise taxation when income taxes are a¢ ne and pref-
erences over consumption goods are separable from labour-leisure choices,
homothetic, and identical across agents. Although the basic argument of
Kaplow (2006) and Laroque (2005) can also be used to prove Deaton￿ s the-
orem,4 in the more general case, when xn is an argument of ’; there is no
reason to believe that the tax schedule which is obtained from the taxation
principle is going to be a¢ ne.
5 Discussion
Theorem 5 shows that, under the given separability and single-crossing con-
ditions, any Pareto-optimal incentive-compatible allocation can be imple-
mented by means of a tax system that leaves the relative prices of x1;:::;xn￿1
4This is shown in Hellwig (2008 b).
7unchanged. Under the given di⁄erentiability assumptions on ’; it follos that
any tax system which distorts the relative prices of x1;:::;xn￿1 is inherently
unsuitable for achieving Pareto optimality in the set of feasible, incentive-
compatible allocations.
If we think of x1;:::;xn￿1 as consumption goods and of xn as the amount
of leisure that is left after producing, say, the output y = 1 ￿ xn of an
intermediate good, this corresponds to the Kaplow-Laroque version of the
Atkinson-Stiglitz result that nonuniform indirect taxation is undesirable.
However, the theorem applies more generally. For example, in the model of
education and production with utility speci￿cation u = ’(c;
y
z)￿e(z;t) that
was sketched in the introduction, Theorem 5 implies that one should not
have a distortionary tax on income, only a distortionary tax on education!5
This ￿nding is at odds with Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005), who call for
a distortionary tax on income and, possibly, subsidies to education. The
di⁄erence is due to their working with the utility speci￿cation (in my nota-
tion) u = c￿￿(
y
tz)￿e(z), for which Theorem 5 indeed calls for distortionary
taxation of income, with no distortions in education choices. In their spec-
i￿cation, the hidden characteristic a⁄ects a person￿ s cost of producing the
output y; in my speci￿cation, it a⁄ects a person￿ s cost of attaining the edu-
cation level z:
It is bothersome to see that such substantive conclusions should depend
on such a ￿ne point as whether a person￿ s "type" a⁄ects the person￿ s pro-
ductivity or the person￿ s cost of attaining a given education level. In general,
an agent￿ s "type" should be a multi-dimensional characteristic which a⁄ects
both. More precisely, it makes sense to think of both the productivity of an
agent with education level z and the cost of achieving this education level
as being unobservable, determined by one or several hidden characteristics.
The question then should be how these two information problems interact
and how this interaction a⁄ects optimal utilitarian taxation. Recognizing
this as an issue provides a good basis for further research on the respective
roles of heterogeneities in productivities and in education costs.
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